

Political representation in evenly split polities

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Numbers and especially the relative size of different ethnic groups are of foremost importance for political outcomes, such as political conflict, ethno-nationalistic polarisation and representation (Key, 1949, Posner, 2004). This paper puts the focus on majoritarian elections in evenly split polities. Relying on models about electoral behaviour and election outcomes in divided societies, it argues that evenly split polities have a particular potential to elect conciliating politicians, and a strong centripetal element might promote cross-ethnic voting. Expectations and assumptions are tested, looking at seven (almost) evenly split towns in South-East Europe for the 2000-2010 period, based on electoral results, semi-structured expert interviews, and secondary material. Empirical results are mixed. If a moderate wins the mayor elections, this is mostly due to strong moderate parties, and non-radicalised preferences, and not a product of the centripetal effect. If however, – as typical in divided societies – ethnic preferences are radicalised, the centripetal effect fails. Instead, in many cases nationalist politicians win the elections, govern either in a strategic alliance with other nationalists, or in coalitions with the moderates of the own ethnic group.

1 Introduction¹

Research about ethnic politics and political representation is particularly interested in models how to decrease ethnic tensions and to foster moderate politicians (Lijphart, 1994a, Horowitz, 1991, Reilly, 2001, Mitchell et al., 2001, etc.). Interestingly enough, there are very few studies of politics in evenly split municipalities (Stroschein, 2011). There, none of the two ethnic groups can form a political majority alone, and therefore, only candidates with inter-ethnic support might win elections under majoritarian rules. Therefore, moderate politicians might be particularly likely to become mayor of evenly split towns.

This paper looks out for such stories of political conciliation in South-East Europe. Looking at seven evenly split towns in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia, and Romania, it investigates both direct and indirect elections of local mayors.

From a theoretical perspective, evenly split polities deserve special attention. The centripetal school of elections in divided societies sustains the idea that elections by majority

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rule in multi-ethnic environments help moderate candidates to be elected (Horowitz, 2003: 122-3).² Empirical results from divided societies show, however, that voters in multi-ethnic environments tend to be more radicalised than in ethnic homogeneous contexts (Sikk and Bochsler, 2008, Stefanović, 2008, Bochsler, 2011a), and this tendency seems to disrupt the expected centripetal effect of majoritarian institutions, if the level of conflict is high (Keech, 1968, Key, 1949, Bochsler, 2009). If there are, however, few moderate voters in mixed environments, then only in polities with an (almost) evenly split population, majoritarian institutions might be powerful enough to engineer inter-ethnic coalitions and elect bridge-builders instead of radicals. In addition, evenly split polities are particularly sensitive to the ethnic colour of representation, and conflict-prone. In an almost evenly split town, power held by the ethnic radical of one side implies the majorisation of 49% of the population.

The election of bridge-building mayors in evenly split polities relies, however, on tight assumptions. The empirical study shows that these are often violated. Either, the political moderates might be so weak that none of the moderate candidates enters the second round of the mayor elections, or, the ethnic nationalists of all sides, in order not to lose power to the moderates, form a strategic alliance. In addition, ethnic identity might be politically extremely dominant, so that even moderate voters would vote solely for candidates of their own ethnic group, and this leads to the election of a nationalist of the ethnic majority to office.

This study analyses seven evenly split towns in South-East Europe. It investigates the formation of local coalitions and mayor elections, using detailed electoral results, secondary material from policy reports, and interviews with experts from three countries of the region.

The paper proceeds as follows: The theoretical section develops the assumptions necessary for the election of a moderate. The third section explains the research design and measurement, followed by a detailed description of mayor elections in seven selected evenly split towns in the fourth section. The fifth section relates the empirical discussion to the theoretical assumption. The sixth section concludes that even in evenly split polities, centripetal incentives are only seldom strong enough to elect bridge-builders to office.

2 Rationale & theoretical expectations

Which institutional system might be best to fulfil the needs of ethnically divided societies? Which electoral system should be chosen? These questions have preoccupied scholars of comparative politics over decades. Consociationalist advice the implementation of institutions

² There are different interpretations of this piece of Horowitz. Note that he, when recommending the Alternative vote, puts the accent on the property that the Alternative Vote "requires 50 percent of the vote plus one for victory". This implies a rational model, on which the theoretical part of this article relies (see section 2). With regards to the 50%+1 property, the Alternative Vote does not differ from the two-round majority vote with runoff rule.

that includes all communal groups into all aspects of political decision-making, providing them with veto rights, and with self-government through regionalisation or decentralisation (Lijphart, 1977, Lijphart, 1994b). Bosnia often serves as a prime example in order to illustrate the failures of consociationalism or power-sharing (Bieber, 2004), as in the Bosnian case, the arrangement that allows for maximal group autonomy and veto-rights is used to block central policy making and to separate politics into different ethnic spheres (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005, Belloni, 2007, Chivvis and Đogo, 2010, etc.).

Instead, the centripetal school proposes that strong political power-holders are elected by electoral rules that empower those politicians with a conciliating program – which have best chances to be supported by different communal groups (Horowitz, 1985, Horowitz, 2003, Reilly, 2001). Their main argument is that in mixed-ethnic environments, different forms of majority voting systems (which allow only candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes to be elected) encourage candidates to seek for votes across ethnic boundaries. This helps moderate candidates, who are able to appeal to both ethnic groups, instead of radicals.

The main enemy of the centripetal effect is, however, Key's effect of radicalisation (Key, 1949, Keech, 1968). Thereafter, in ethnically divided societies, which are in the spotlight of the centripetal school, voters in mixed-ethnic environments are more likely to vote for ethnic nationalists than in homogeneous places. Recent work shows that the effect works also outside the US (Sikk and Bochsler, 2008, Stefanović, 2008, Bochsler, 2009). This implies that mixed-ethnic districts might help nationalists to be elected. The favourite institution of the centripetalists, the Alternative Vote, is applied hardly anywhere, but similar expectations can be made for the two-round majority vote with runoff rule.³ Scarce empirical evidence from elections under the Alternative Vote (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004, Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006) and under the similar two-round majority vote (Bochsler, 2009) shows that the centripetal effect is limited, and often, ethnic radicals win, instead of the moderates.

Instead, candidate appeals to the ethnic minority are a recipe to lose votes among the majority, while appealing to the radicals of the majority is a secure recipe to win elections (Glazer et al., 1998, Bochsler, 2011a). Voters' preferences in mixed-ethnic contexts are often so radicalised that the pivotal voter is a nationalist of the ethnic majority. Then, nationalist candidate of the majority are elected without seeking any votes across ethnic boundaries.

However, there is hope for the centripetal effect to work, even in deeply divided societies, if one sets the conditions accordingly. Either, one might move towards models with more than two groups, where none of the groups is in the position of a majority, but there are only few

³ The two strongest candidates of the first round are eligible in the runoff. There are few differences between the Alternative Vote and the runoff rule. Most importantly, under the runoff majority vote, turnout might drop in the 2nd round of elections.

corresponding empirical cases, and hence, the application of such ideas is quite limited (Bochsler, 2011b). Or, one might assume that the ethnic conflict is mono-dimensional.⁴ In electoral districts with a clear majority, the pivotal voter might be an ethnic nationalist, but this becomes less likely if the size of the two groups become more similar.

If an electoral district, or in more general terms, a polity, is (almost) equally split into two groups, then each of the two groups might find it particularly difficult to form a political majority. For electoral systems, which require the candidates to win a majority of votes, in evenly split polities, we find the strongest imaginable incentive to appeal for voters across ethnic boundaries. Alternatively, they would need to gather almost every single vote of the slightly larger ethnic group, but again, they would need to keep the most moderate voters in mind, if they should not risk that a candidate of the other ethnic group appeals to them with a moderate position.

The centripetal model should work under any system that allows candidates to be elected solely with an absolute majority of votes. It relies on the following scenario:

- In the first round of elections, every voter votes for his/her favourite candidate, which is usually a candidate of their own ethnic group.
- In further rounds, the weakest candidates drop out. If the moderate candidate of the ethnic group A drops out, his or her voters are expected to shift their preferences to a moderate candidate of ethnic group B, rather than to the radical candidate of group A, or to the radical of group B. Similarly, if all candidates of ethnic group A drop out, voters of this group are expected to vote for the most moderate candidate of group B.
- Jointly, the first-preference votes for moderate candidates, and second-preference votes, help moderates to win the elections.

This centripetal relies on several assumptions.

1. There needs to be a single continuous dimension of ethnic politics, ranging from radicals of group A, over moderates of group A and moderates of group B to radicals of group B, and preferences along this dimension are single-peaked. Differently phrased, voters of group A will always prefer more moderate candidates of group B over radical candidates of group B. This assumption is violated if radicals A and B agree to exchange second preferences or to support each other in the second round of elections (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004, Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006), and it might also be violated if there are important non-ethnic dimensions of voting.

⁴ Hence, either there are two groups, and if there are further groups, they are in a political coalition with one of the two main groups, or stand in between the two (and, thus, become comparable with the moderates of either of both groups).

2. Moderate voters favour moderate candidates over those of their own ethnic group. If their own candidate drops out of the election, they need to shift their vote to a moderate candidate of the other ethnic group (if there is such a candidate) (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004, Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006). Especially in salient ethnic conflicts, this assumption might not hold. In addition, moderate parties might agree on mutual support with the radicals of their own ethnic group.
3. None of the nationalist candidates (or no bloc of nationalists) gains an absolute majority of the first voting preferences. For evenly split municipalities, this assumption is almost always fulfilled. It might only be violated, if the slightly larger of both groups consists almost exclusively of nationalist voters (but in the present paper, we face difficulties in measuring this assumption, see below).
4. At least one moderate candidate (of either group) needs to have sufficient first-round preferences, so that she can enter in the second / last round of elections. Otherwise, if there is no sufficiently strong moderate candidate – even if one of them would be the Condorcet-winner – and only radicals make it to the last round of the election.

If one of the four assumptions is violated, the centripetal effect does not (necessarily) work. If assumption 1 or 2 is violated, it is likely; if assumption 3 or 4 is violated, it is almost certain that a radical candidate is elected, instead of a moderate one.

The centripetal effect competes with a rivalling hypothesis, relating to the standard explanation of elections under majoritarian rules (Cox, 1997): the candidate of the strongest party (or the strongest bloc) of the larger of the two ethnic groups wins the elections. We consider this as our null hypothesis.

3 Operationalisation & Data

As outlined in the rationale, this study is interested in majoritarian elections in ethnically evenly split polities with two dominant ethnic groups. Ideally, we need to select polities, which do not only elect by majority rules, but in parallel also hold elections by proportional representation, so that we also have information about the strength of political parties in elections, which are not affected by the majority vote. Given the lack of evenly split countries that correspond to these criteria, we move to the sub-national level of politics. Usually, the majority vote with a two-round runoff rule applies for mayor elections, while local assemblies and national parliaments are elected by PR rules, often even simultaneously.

We selected towns, which are split approximately 50%:50% between ethnic groups that define the main ethnic conflict(s) in their countries, and we selected four countries in South-

East Europe with salient ethnic conflicts: The largest ethnic minority and the most salient ethnic conflict in Romania is with ethnic Hungarians, represented by the evenly split (ethnic Romanian-Hungarian) town of Târgu Mureş. In Macedonia, the most salient ethnic conflict is with the Albanians, the largest minority group, and there are two evenly split towns, Kičevo and Struga. In Serbia, there are three salient ethnic conflicts, with Bosniaks, Albanians, and Hungarians (in decreasing order, regarding the saliency). Jointly with Roma (which do not live territorially concentrated, so that there is no evenly split town), these are also the largest minorities of Serbia. We select Bujanovac (Albanian-Serb), Prijepolje (Bosniak-Serb), and the rural municipality of Čoka (as there is no evenly split Hungarian-Serb town). Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are ethnic conflicts between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, but there is no census data reflecting the ethnic identity of current residents; however, there is data showing that Mostar is evenly split between Croats and Bosniaks. We gathered evidence on mayor elections in the period 2000-2010, looking at the election results (available from the Electoral Commissions, Statistical Offices and further sources⁵), at census data for the ethnic structure, and estimates for Mostar. We relied on expert interviews and on secondary sources (newspaper, academic reports, policy papers) to gather information about the ethnic conflict, party and candidate positions, electoral campaigns and cross-ethnic voting. Data about local coalitions in Serbia for the period 2004-2008 are obtained from an election monitoring organisation.⁶ As detailed information is rare for most of the towns, we conducted some two dozens semi-structured interviews with local politics experts (journalists, academics, collaborators of international organisations) in Serbia, Macedonia and in Romania, and we interviewed local politicians in the two towns in Southern Serbia.

We attempted to capture two aspects of the political outcome of elections.

1. The political position of the elected mayor and other parties and candidates on ethnic issues, inter-ethnic cooperation and nationalism. As we can not rely on objective and valid measures about the political positioning of candidates, we were attempting to identify relevant differences in the positioning. There, where several political parties compete for the votes of the same ethnic group, we aimed at distinguishing parties with regards to their degree of nationalism and a program oriented solely towards their

⁵ For Bujanovac: (OSCE ODIHR 2002); B92, 5 June 2006, "Mustafi Preševo, Draškoviću Medveda ". For Čoka, homepage of the municipality, <http://www.coka.rs/>, last accessed 29 March 2011.

⁶ Ethnic structure for Romania, <http://www.edrc.ro/recensamant.jsp>, for Mostar: International Crisis Group (2003a), Serbia: Republic Statistical Office, Census 2002, Population by national or ethnic groups, <http://webzrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/Zip/eSn31.pdf>; Macedonia: State Statistical Office, Census of Population 2002, Book XIII, Total Population, Households and Dwellings According to the Territorial Organisation of the Republic of Macedonia, <http://www.stat.gov.mk/english/publikacii/knigaXIII.pdf> [all addresses verified in March 2011]. Local coalitions in Serbia: 2004-8: Cesid Niš, 2005, "Vladajuće koalicije po opstinama u Srbiji".

own ethnic group, or vice-versa their attempts to promote a program of conciliation and inter-ethnic integration.⁷

2. Evidence for cross-ethnic coalitions or cross-ethnic voting, reported by interviewees or in analysed material. As cross-ethnic coalitions (or voting), we address formal or informal coalitions that include the two main ethnic groups, not looking at alliances between one of the two large groups and some tiny minorities.

To operationalise the model, we investigated the following aspects:

Existence of a strong moderate candidate. In order to avoid a tautological measure, looking at strength of the mayor candidates in order to explain whether they were elected, we rely on the voting results from national parliamentary elections or from elections of the local council, in close temporal distance to the mayor elections. This allows us to identify whether there is a party that might present a strong moderate candidate for the mayor elections.

Pre-electoral coalitions. We are interested in pre-electoral coalitions either of moderate parties (which might support the hypothesis that cross-ethnic dynamics in evenly split polities help moderate candidates), or in coalitions of nationalists (which we have described as an obstacle for political moderation). We have gathered information about local coalitions, and about national governing coalitions that were relevant for local cooperation. Often, local politics follows the pattern of the coalition of the national government, or other forms of coalitions that were suggested by the national party office, especially in countries where political parties are centralised. High centralisation is a feature of political parties in all countries under study.

Multi-ethnic campaigns and identities. Through analysis of the available material and speaking to local experts, we particularly aimed at identifying any elements of a multi-ethnic identity of candidates, or multi-ethnic electoral *campaigns*

⁷ The same information is used to operationalise those explanatory variables that rely on measures of ethnic radicalism. As our measure gives us only information about the candidates' position relative to other candidates, but no absolute position, the third assumption (there is no absolute majority of the radicals of one ethnic group in the municipality) can not be operationalised. Even if the selected cases are almost evenly split, in most cases, there is a very slight (sometimes temporary) majority of the voters of one ethnic group. If there is a sole radical candidate, assumption 3 would be violated. Also, if there are several candidates appealing to voters of the same group, and all of them are Radicals, the assumption would be violated. However, once there are several candidates or parties of the same group running in elections, we are categorising them by their degree of radicalism, which again implies that we assume that one of them is a moderate, and the other one a radical – and hence our measure does not allow us to test this assumption properly. More appropriate, absolute measures of candidate positions, comparable across countries and ethnic groups, are currently examined by a different research team; we aim at employing them for our research once they are available.

4 Comparative analysis of seven towns in South-East Europe

4.1 Struga

Population: Albanian 56.9%; Macedonian 32.1%; Turks 5.7%; others.

	<i>turnout</i>	<i>majority* nationalists</i>	<i>majority* moderates</i>	<i>minority moderates</i>	<i>minority nationalists</i>
Parliament, 2006	49.4%	VMRO Koal: 20.1% VMRO-NP: 3.9%	SDSM: 11.0% others jointly 5% Torbeši - PEI: 18.1%	DPA: 17.3%	DUI-PDP: 23.2%
Local assembly, 2005	53.7%	VMRO-DPMNE: 6.9% VMRO-NP: 3.7%	SDSM: 15.6%	DPA-PDP: 28.1% ND: 6.1%	DUI: 39.6%
Mayor, 2005 ... 2nd round	28.3%	<i>not available</i>		DPA-PDP: 1.7%	DUI (Ramis Merko): 96.9%
Local assembly, 2009	53.4%	VMRO-DPMNE: 19.0%	SDSM : 11.9% Torbeši – PEI: 11.0%	DPA: 13.7% ND: 8.3% LDP: 3.1%	DUI: 27.2%
Mayor, 2009 ... 2nd round	53.4% 56.2%	VMRO-DPMNE (Slavko Koteski): 23.4%	PEI (Fijat Canoski): 24.5% (no SDSM candidate) PEI: 46.4%	DPA: 17.2 ND: 4.4%	DUI (Ramis Merko): 30.5% DUI: 51.7%

Table 1: Overview over electoral results (parliamentary, local assembly, mayor), Struga, 2005-9.

* Parties representing the titular nation of the country or not nationally defined parties (mainstream parties).

Struga is divided mainly between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians, in Western Macedonia. As part of the agreement to settle the violent conflict in Macedonia in 2001 (Ohrid framework agreement), Macedonian municipalities were empowered and certain municipal borders redrawn. In 2004, and a number of rural villages were included into the municipality of Struga, in order to engineer a narrow Albanian majority. A local minority, however, are Torbeši, a local group which shares the language with Macedonians, and the religion (Islam) with Albanians (Dikici, 2008). Given that ethnic identities are fluent, and members of the Torbeši group use to declare different identities (Albanian, Macedonian, Turks, etc.) in the census, the exact proportions of the ethnic communities are not fixed, and depend on the social and political context. Torbeši might be bridge-builders between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians, and also pivotal voters.

In parliamentary and assembly elections (by proportional representation), the nationalist Albanian party, Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) was the largest party among the

largest ethnic group, and also obtained the absolute majority of the Albanian votes.⁸ Other Albanian parties, especially ND and DPA, have moderated their positions and their rhetoric. The Macedonian political scene is dominated by the moderate Social Democrats (SDSM) and the previously nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party. The null hypothesis implies that DUI would win the mayor office. Indeed, in the 2005 elections, DUI candidate Ramiz Merko was the first Albanian elected mayor. He is perceived as ethnic hardliner, and his conduct of office was not very helpful to settle the ethnic conflict.

In the subsequent local elections of 2009, ethnic Macedonian parties tried to strengthen a moderate candidate, who would be, at least, the lesser evil than the disputed mayor Merko, and acceptable to both communities. Given the salient conflict, no Macedonian has chances to win Albanian. Therefore, Fijat Canoski, an influential local businessperson of the Torbeši minority would have had the potential to build bridges between Macedonians and Albanians. Both communities perceive the Torbeši as their ethnic kin, and hence eligible for both sides. Macedonian parties realised that Canoski was the only candidate to defeat the Albanians in the mayor elections. Although we received contradictory information whether they openly campaigned for Canoski, inter-ethnic voting is evident from the electoral results: In the first round of the elections, the candidates of the Macedonian parties received much fewer votes than their actual strength, whereas the votes for Canoski outnumbered the votes of his party (PEI) in the simultaneous assembly elections by far. We have compiled data from 75 electoral wards, and compared the votes cast for the mayor candidates in the first and the second round of the mayor elections to local assembly (by PR) elections. This reveals patterns of inter-ethnic vote flows. In the first round, Canoski received a few of the votes of the VMRO-DPMNE party (possibly 10%), but was widely supported by SDSM voters. VMRO-DPMNE, previously the nationalist Macedonian party, but now reformed and more conciliating, allegedly portrayed a weak candidate, while the moderate SDSM did not even present an own candidate. This indirect support for Canoski was needed, in order to make him enter the second round of the elections against the incumbent Merko. It seems, however, that Canoski did not receive any ethnic Albanian votes in the first round (detailed analyses, see appendix).

In the second round, the comparison of the results of electoral wards suggest that, while turnout increased slightly, Canoski could win the bulk of the Macedonian votes: almost all voters of the moderate SDSM, but also the overwhelming part of the rather nationalist VMRO-DPMNE voters might have switched to Canoski. Also, Canoski could score some 20% of the votes in the stronghold of the moderate Albanian DPA party. However, about 70%

⁸ Background information about minority politics in Macedonia: (Brunnbauer, 2007, Friedman, 2005, Taleski, 2008)

of the moderate Albanian voters still preferred the radical Albanian incumbent Merko. This, and, how international specialists ascertain, electoral fraud (voter intimidation and vote buying), secured a narrow victory for Merko, with 52.7% of the votes, over Canoski. Fair conduct of the elections might have secured the office to the moderate Canoski.

DUI joined a coalition with the nationalist Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE, their partner in the national government. Allegedly, the parties are linked by common business interests.

4.2 Kičevo

Population: Macedonian 54%; Albanian 31%; Turks 8%; Roma 5%.

	<i>turnout</i>	<i>majority* nationalists</i>	<i>majority* moderates</i>	<i>minority moderates</i>	<i>minority nationalists</i>
Parliament, 2006	58.8%	VMRO Koal: 41.2% VMRO-NP: 7.6%	SDSM: 21.3% others: 7%	DPA: 2.1% PEI: 1.5%	DUI-PDP: 18.7%
Local assembly, 2005	<i>not available</i>	VMRO-DPMNE: 27.6% VMRO-NP: 13.7%	SDSM: 24.7% DA: 4.1% others: 5.8%	DPA-PDP: 3.2% Turks – PDT: 4.1%	DUI: 16.8%
Mayor, 2005 ... 2nd round	57.8%	<i>not available</i> Non-partisan, Vladimir Toleski: 50.9%	<i>other candidates not available</i>		
Local assembly, 2009	56.1% (7.2% invalid)	VMRO-DPMNE: 40.6%	SDSM: 11.5% LDP: 4.2% others: 5.5%	DPA: 1.5% ND: 1.4% others: 5.1% Turks – PDT: 2.1%; DNET: 1.3% Roma – PCERM: 4.1% Torbeši – PEI: 2.9%	DUI: 10.6%
Mayor, 2009	56.1% (9.5% invalid)	VMRO-DPMNE (Blagoja Despotski): 59.0%	SDSM (Slobodan Avramoski): 17.6% LDP (Bobi Mojsoski): 10.3%	ND (Džavit Balazi): 8.6% DPA (Dervis Alimi): 4.6%	no DUI candidate
		elected in 1 st round			

Table 2: Overview over electoral results (parliamentary, local assembly, mayor), Kičevo, 2005-9.

Kičevo is split between ethnic Macedonians (54% of the population), ethnic Albanians (31%), Turks and Roma, the Turkish being politically close to the ethnic Albanians. The municipal borders are due to be changed, in order to engineer a larger Albanian population, but this process has been postponed.

The mayor is elected directly. Given that Macedonians are the largest groups, given that the nationalist Macedonian parties are stronger than the moderates, and given that VMRO-DPMNE is the largest party, it is the expected winner, according to the null hypothesis. In the 2005 elections, three strong ethnic Macedonian candidates ran in elections. Two Macedonian candidates were nominated by SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE. The third candidate, the influential local businessperson Vladimir Toleski, ran as an independent, but stood close to the nationalist wing of VMRO, which has split-off the party the year before. He quit the party during the internal struggle about the direction of the party. The strongest Albanian candidate was nominated by the rather radical Albanian DUI party, at this time in coalition with SDSM at the national level. "All mayor ethnic Macedonian contestants, including the Social Democrats, VMRO-DPMNE and Vladimir Toleski [...] distributed campaign material also in Albanian language. There were even Albanian-language spots on local TV" (European Stability Initiative, 2006: 7). Numbers, however, show that turnout in the second round of the mayor elections was low – indicating that not too many ethnic Albanian voters were keen to vote for an ethnic Macedonian. As an expert for local politics told us, there were "essentially no voters that vote multi-ethnically": "Ahead of elections, the political discourse is even more radicalised than usually." Inter-ethnic cooperation seems rather as punctual, if it serves business interests, which are omnipresent in local politics.

The 2009 elections were fought essentially between two main ethnic Macedonian candidates. The candidate of the previously nationalist oriented VMRO-DPMNE party Blagoja Despotoski, was also supported by a broad coalition of minor parties, including an ethnic Turkish party, but VMRO-DPMNE's Albanian partner DUI did not declare their support openly. His main competitor was the candidate of the more moderate SDSM, Slobodan Avramovski. Apart from this, a small Macedonian party and two minor Albanian parties were presenting candidates for the elections, but most importantly, the largest – radical - Albanian minority party DUI did not present an own candidate. According to the centripetal model, this would be a situation where the ethnic Albanian voters might support the more moderate of the two Macedonian candidates. However, the largest Albanian party DUI was cooperating with VMRO-DPMNE in the national government, and there seem to have been non public agreements about an extension of this coalition to the local level.

Relying on detailed data from 35 electoral wards, we find that the Albanian parties got much less electoral support than their population share. In DUI strongholds, a considerable number of Albanian voters might have voted for the VMRO-DPMNE candidate in the mayor elections – roughly 25% of the DUI voters, whereas the SDSM candidate seems not to have

benefitted from the votes of any other party in the local elections.⁹ This was enough, however, for the VMRO-DPMNE candidate to be elected in the first round of the elections.

4.3 Prijepolje

Population: Serbian 54.8%; Bosniak/Muslim 43.4%

	<i>turnout</i>	<i>majority* nationalists</i>	<i>majority* moderates</i>	<i>minority moderates</i>	<i>minority nationalists</i>
Local assembly, 2004 (seats)	48.2%	SRS: 11 DSS: 7 SPS: 4 NS: 4	DS: 6 SDU: 3 GSS: 3	SDP: 12	SDA: 11
Mayor, 2004	47.9%	SRS: 16.5% DSS: 16.2% SD: 6.1% NS: 5.0% SPS: 3.4%	DS: 6.9% others: 5.2% non-partisans: 3.5%	SDP (Nedžad Turković): 19.7%	LzS (Aziz Hadžifejzović): 17.6%
... 2nd round	31.6%			SDP: 70.7%	LzS/SDA: 29.3%
Local assembly, repeated elections, 2009	58.7%	SNS 15.0% DSS-NS 7.4% SRS 6.9%	DS-SPS-G17-SPO: 14.8% LDP: 6.2% PUPS: 4.2%	SDP 26.7% DPS 12.7%	SDA 6.3%
Mayor, 2009 (elected by parliament)		SNS (Dragoljub Zindović), in coalition with DS-SPS-G17-SPO and SDP			

Table 3: Overview over electoral results (local assembly, mayor), Prijepolje, 2004-9.

Parliamentary elections omitted, because Bosniak parties ran in coalitions with Serbian parties.

Prijepolje is a Serbian-Bosniak split town in Southern Serbia. Although located in the midst of the hotspots of the violent conflicts of the 1990s, located in the Muslim-dominated Sandžak region between Bosnia and Kosovo, ethnic tensions have remained low in Prijepolje (International Crisis Group, 2005). The political landscape of the ethnic Serbian parties is rather dominated by the nationalist and ultranationalist parties, DSS and SRS, while moderate parties, such as DS or G17+ tend to be weaker than at the national average.¹⁰ Three parties compete for Bosniak vote. All of them have emanated in the pro-autonomist SDA, but its first split-off, SDP, has soon adopted a more pragmatic program of cooperation, and has a stronger civic oriented program, while the SDA stresses group rights more, so that we count SDP as the more moderate option. The SDP split-off DPS is a small, local party of an influential Bosniak businessman in Prijepolje. It uses more radical rhetoric than SDP, but is told to be quite pragmatic in coalition-building.

⁹ Voters for a non-partisan Albanian electoral group in the assembly elections (Xhehat Jashari) might have voted in large numbers for the VMRO-DPMNE candidate, and to a lesser degree for the SDSM candidate, but there are no sufficiently clear strongholds of this group to ascertain this.

¹⁰ On Serbian (minority) parties, see (Goati, 2006, Bašić and Crnjanski, 2006, Zuber, 2010).

As Serbs are the larger of both groups, and as the Serbian nationalists – originally the Serbian Radicals SRS, after 2008 the Serbian Progressist Party SNS – are the largest party of the Serbs, the null hypothesis states that the Serbian nationalists should hold the mayor office.

After the incumbent Serb mayor retired, the Bosniak SDP candidate won the mayor elections in 2004, in the second round. While the Serbian votes in the first round were fractionalised on ten candidates of mainly Serb parties,¹¹ only the two larger Bosniak parties SDA and SDP were running with their own candidates, and votes were almost evenly split on the two, narrowly outnumbering the number of votes for the strongest Serbian candidate. This meant that the second round was fought between two Bosniaks, even if Bosniaks are narrowly a minority in Prijepolje. Facing the choice between two Bosniaks, Serbian parties unofficially supported the candidate of SDP, the more moderate and more reliable party, given that it cooperated with Serbian parties also in the national parliament. Serbian voters obviously mainly voted for the SDP candidate, Nedžad Turković; no other explanation might account for his massive increase in votes (absolute and relative) between the 1st and the 2nd round of elections. Being the head teacher, Turković was popular and trusted across ethnic lines. SDP, which is in a permanent rivalry with the other large Bosniak party SDA, governed in a coalition jointly with the Serbian pro-democratic parties (DSS, DS, NS, GSS, Social Democrats), excluding mainly the two old regime parties SPS and the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radicals.

Note that under majoritarian systems with several rounds (such as the Alternative Vote), some second preferences of Serb voters might supposedly have moved to the Serbian Radical candidate, who was only little behind the two Bosniaks. Hence, the final round would probably have been fought between the Serbian Radical and the stronger of the two Bosniak candidates - whether this is the radical SDA candidate or the more moderate SDP candidate (if gathering some second-preference votes from Serb voters) is unclear - and the result of the election would depend on the moderate versus group-oriented preferences of Serb voters.

Four years later, the election law moved the competence for mayor elections to the local assembly. Elections of 2008 needed to be repeated, as the representative elected in first instance were not able in forming a coalition within the prescribed time frame after the elections. After annulled and repeated elections, a coalition was quickly formed between the now largest party, the moderate Bosniaks SDP, the large nationalist party SNS and a moderate Serbian alliance around DS. The coalition was essentially brokered in the national party offices in Belgrade, and the local branches seem not even to have been consulted on this issue. For instance, none of the presidents of the three coalition partners seemed to be able to

¹¹ We could not establish the ethnic affiliation of a non-partisan candidate who gathered 3.5% of the votes.

explain us why the Serbian nationalists SNS, which are not pivotal, and the second-largest party in the coalition, were accorded the mayor position, without adequate compensation for the other parties. The argument that this compensates for the election of an ethnic Bosniak in 2004 are little credible, as this was not part of the agreement of 2004; SNS did not exist at this time, and its predecessor SRS was not included in the 2004-2008 coalition.

The election of a Bosniak moderate in 2004 was the result of the rare constellation, where two Bosniak candidates entered the second round. The election of a Serbian nationalist in 2008 seems to be the rather awkward result of a coalition of nationalists and moderates, and not necessary, as those nationalists do not have pivotal power in any case.

4.4 Bujanovac

Population: Albanians 54.7%; Serbs 34.1%; Roma 8.9% (according to the 2002 census)

	<i>turnout</i>	<i>majority* nationalists</i>	<i>majority* moderates</i>	<i>minority moderates</i>	<i>minority nationalists</i>
Local assembly, 2002		SRS-SPO: 10.7%	DS-DSS-DA-DHSS-ND-NS 27.9%	PDD 30.9% Alb Dem Unija 3.6%	PDP 17.9%
Mayor, 2002			Coalition/DS (Novica Manojlović): 43%	PDD (Nagip Arifi): 55%	
Local assembly, 2006 (seats)		SRS: 12	DSS-DS-G17-LS-SDP-SPO-SPS-NS-PSS: 5	PDD: 13 Roma – Partija za ujedinjenje Roma: 2	PDP: 9
Mayor, 2006		SRS (Svetislav Stojmenović): 31.5%	DSS-DS-G17-LS-SDP-SPO-SPS-NS-PSS (Slobodan Jovanović): 11%	PDD (Nagip Aripri): 35%	PDP (Jonuz Musliu): 22.1% DPA (Sali Salihi): 0.3%*
... 2nd round		SRS (Svetislav Stojmenović): 46%		PDD (Nagip Arifi): 55%	
Local assembly, 2008	56.0%	SRS: 19.4% DSS: 5.1%	DS-G17-SPO: 7.9% Non-partisans: 8.2%	PDD: 28.2% DUA Zeqiri: 7.5% Roma - Partia e bashkuar Rome 2.3% Partia Rome: 2.1%	PDP: 14.0% DPA-NDP: 4.2%
Mayor, 2009 (elected by parliament)				PDD (Shajp Kamberi), coalition with DS, non-partisans, DUA, PDP	

Table 4: Overview over electoral results (local assembly, mayor), Bujanovac, 2002-8.

Parliamentary elections omitted, because large parts of the Albanian voters boycott national elections.

* The DPA candidate in 2006 withdrew his candidacy.

Bujanovac is one of the three Serbian municipalities with a considerable Albanian population, and was the centre of violent uprising in 2000-1 (International Crisis Group, 2003b). The local elections of 2002 were part of the plan to settle the conflict (Čović plan). The local assembly was elected by PR, whereas mayor elections were held by majoritarian rules. None of the ethnic groups has a clear majority and population numbers fluctuate, due to migration. Therefore, the elections of 2002 were particularly thrilling, and their outcome open. Four relevant Albanian parties are or have been active in Bujanovac. They range from the rather pragmatic PDD, the largest Albanian party in Bujanovac, which is open to cooperation with the Serbian state, to the more radical DPA, which also emphasises separatist projects, but is marginal in Bujanovac. Further, DUA is a local PDD split-off. PDP is another local Albanian party, which stresses its legacy as the political arm of the armed forces, but behaves pragmatically in many situations.¹² Serbs are organised in the nationalist parties SRS and DSS/NS, and around the more moderate parties of the DOS coalition (DS, G17+, and a local citizens' group); the position of the SPS has fluctuated.

As the Albanians are the larger of the two groups, and the less radical PDD is the largest Albanian party in Bujanovac, the null hypothesis states that PDD would win the mayor office. Given the narrow political situation, both Serbs and Albanians managed to coordinate their candidates in 2002, and only the largest party of each group ran with their own candidate. All Albanian parties supported the candidate of the moderate PDD, Nagip Arifi, while the Serbian parties were running with the common candidate Novica Manojlović, a member of the moderate DS party. PDD candidate Arifi won with 55% of the votes, but governed in a multi-ethnic coalition with a part of the Serbian parties, which were important due to their links to the central government in Belgrade. By the next following elections, 2006, the strength of the Serbian parties in Bujanovac and the coalitions among them had changed, so that the candidate of the ultra-nationalist SRS, Svetislav Stojmenović, entered the second round, against the Albanian incumbent Nagip Arifi, who gained (supported by the all Albanian parties) in the second round, and governed with an exclusively Albanian coalition.

In the 2008 local elections, the mayor was elected indirectly, by the local assembly. The governing majority coalition was composed exclusively by Albanian parties. The Albanian parties elected Šajp Kamberi as their mayor, the candidate of the less radical and largest Albanian party, PDD. Only in October 2010, under pressure from the international community and cross-concessions of the central government in Belgrade, the local

¹² See also International Crisis Group (2003b, 2006, 2007) and Huszka (2007).

government coalition was extended to two rather small and moderate Serbian groups, DS and non-partisans. The coalition is oversized, and all Albanian parties stayed in the coalition, so that the Albanian part of the coalition still controls the absolute majority of the assembly seats. The local leaders of the participating parties told us that the coalition would even sensitive ethnic issues by agreement, and that they would avoid ethnic voting patterns. However, the Albanian parties would only join the coalition united, all parties together – in order to be able to act as a majority, and as otherwise, parties risk to be considered as betrayers. This gives Albanian parties considerable power, and the oversized coalition gives them the hypothetical possibility to pass any decision in the assembly, if needed.

4.5 Čoka

Population: Hungarian 51.6%; Serbs 37.6%; Roma 2.4%; Slovaks 1.5%; Yugoslavs** 1.7%; undeclared/regional/unknown** 3.1% (2002 census). ** Might be members of mixed families.

	<i>turnout</i>	<i>majority* nationalists</i>	<i>majority* moderates</i>	<i>minority moderates</i>	<i>minority nationalists</i>
Local assembly, 2004 (seats)	46.8%	SRS: 5 PSS: 2	DS: 4 G17+: 3 LSV: 2 others: 2	SVM: 6	DZVM: 1
Mayor, 2004	46.8%	SRS: 14.8% PSS: 10.0%	DS: 16.1% G17: 13.5% LSV: 12.7% non-partisans: 9.3%	SVM: 19.6%	DZVM: 4.2%
... 2nd round	43.4%		DS: 64.1%	SVM: 35.9%	
Local assembly, 2008 (seats)	65.4%	SRS: 17.8% DSS-NS-SPS: 3.8%	DS: 30.2% LSV: 7.1% G17+: 3.3%	SVM-DZVM: 25.4%	
Mayor, 2008 (elected by parliament)			DS (Predrag Mijić), coalition with SVM		

Table 5: Overview over electoral results (local assembly, mayor), Čoka, 2004-8.

Parliamentary elections omitted, because Hungarian parties ran in coalitions with multi-ethnic parties.

We have also included Čoka in our analysis, as this municipality is evenly split between Serbs and ethnic Hungarians, the most numerous minority in Serbia. Čoka is a rural municipality in the Vojvodina region, and we did not find any evidence for fierce ethnic conflicts. While the census of 2002 reports a Hungarian majority of 51.6%, recent migration might have changed the numbers, so that ethnic Hungarians might have lost their absolute majority.¹³

By 2004, the municipality was governed by a mayor of the moderate Hungarian minority party SVM. However, apparently a very substantial part of the Hungarian population votes for non-ethnic parties, and some of the moderate Serbian parties (or rather: mainstream parties),

¹³ Nikolić, Goran (28 January 2011), "Etnički aspekt popisa 2011 u štokavskim zemljama", B92 blog, <http://blog.b92.net/text/17127/Etnicki-aspekt-popisa-2011-u-štokavskim-zemljama/> (last accessed on 3 March 2011).

such as DS and LSV, are known that they have considerable support among ethnic minorities in Vojvodina. According to the null hypothesis, however, we would expect that the largest Hungarian party – SVM – will obtain the mayor of Čoka.

In the first round of the mayor elections of 2004, the two candidates of ethnic Hungarian parties (SVM and DZVM) obtained only 24% of the votes, while the moderate Serbian or multi-ethnic parties obtained other 35% of the votes.¹⁴ In the second round, the DS candidate Predrag Mijić, an ethnic Serb (Damjanović, 2008), won a landslide victory with 2943 out of 4591 votes (compared to 785 in the first round). While turnout was quite stable, results show that both the SVM candidate gained some 700 votes between the first round (957 votes) and the second round (1648 votes), supposedly votes from ethnic Hungarians. The DS candidate gained 2200 votes between the two rounds, which corresponds approximately to the votes of the other Serbian and multi-ethnic parties. The elections closely reflect the case where a moderate candidate wins the elections in the second round, gaining the moderate votes from both groups, and being the less evil candidate for those nationalists who do not have their own candidate any more in the second round. Hence, the inter-ethnic effect of moderation might have played, and certainly, the DS candidate profited from support from both communities in the second round. We do not know whether there might have been attempts to strategically vote for the DS candidate in the first round: he was the most likely candidate of a Serbian or multi-ethnic party who could have defeated the candidate of the Hungarian SVM in the second round of the elections. In the second round, the DS candidate clearly benefitted from votes from both communities: the ethnic Hungarian votes which usually go to the multi-ethnic parties DS and LSV, and the votes of the ethnic Serbs. Mijić's DS was governing in a coalition with the main Hungarian minority party SVM and the multi-ethnic LSV.

Four years later, when Serbia moved to indirect mayor elections through the local assembly, Mijić was re-elected as mayor, governing jointly with the now allied Hungarian minority parties SVM and DZVM.¹⁵ The election of the DS candidate can not be clearly attributed to the inter-ethnic effect. It might also be the consequence of DS being the largest party (null hypothesis), appealing to both ethnic groups, and possibly gaining as many votes from ethnic Hungarians as the ethnic Hungarian coalition SVM-DZVM

¹⁴ We do not know the political and ethnic identity of the non-partisan candidate in the 2004 elections.

¹⁵ Čokanska hronika, August 2008, "Predrag Mijić ponovo izabran za predsednika Čoke", <http://www.coka.rs/hronika/2008/avgust/1.html> [last accessed 15 October 2010].

4.6 Mostar

Population: Croats 58.2%; Bosniaks 40.3%; Serbs 1.5% (estimates: International Crisis Group, 2003a: 15)

	<i>turnout</i>	<i>majority* nationalists</i>	<i>majority* moderates</i>	<i>minority moderates</i>	<i>minority nationalists</i>
Parliamentary, 2004 (vote shares)	<i>not available</i>	SDA: 18.4% SBiH: 16.8% BPS: 4.3%	SDP: 7.4%	Radom za Boljtitak: 3.7%	HDZ 1990 - HSS-HKDU-HDU-Demokrišćani: 18.9% HDZ-HNZ: 17.5% HSP: 5.3% Serbs – SNSD 2.1%
Local assembly, 2004 (seats)	<i>not available</i>	SDA: 10 SBiH: 4	SDP: 4	Radom za Boljtitak: 1	HDZ-UHSP-HSP-HKDU-HNZ: 15 HDZ 1990: HSP: 1
Mayor, 2004 (elected by parliament)					HDZ
Local assembly, 2008 (vote shares)	<i>not available</i>	SDA: 23.4% SBiH: 4.3% BPS: 2.3%	SDP: 8.9% Naša stranka: 1.6%	Radom za Boljtitak: 19.8%	HDZ: 18.6% HDZ 1990: 8.0% HSP: 6.3% Serbs – SNSD-PDP 2.3%
Mayor, 2008 (elected by parliament)		<i>no candidate elected</i>			
Mayor, 2010 (elected by parliament)		HDZ: 11 (Ljubo Bešlić) 1 st round	Radom za boljtitak (Marko Romić): 4		SDA (Suad Hasandedić): 15
... 2 nd round		HDZ: 13 (Ljubo Bešlić)			SDA (Suad Hasandedić): 15
... 3 rd round		HDZ: 17 (Ljubo Bešlić), supported by “Radom za boljtitak”			SDA (Suad Hasandedić): 15

Table 6: Overview over electoral results (parliament, local assembly, mayor), Mostar, 2004-10.

Mostar is a divided town in Southwest Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the last census, the city was divided evenly among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, but after the war of 1992-5, most Serbs have left, and Croats are a narrow majority. Mostar is important to ethnic Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the centre of power for the region where they settle. Therefore, also the institutional arrangements of coalitions in Mostar are of particular importance, and the electoral system – whether proportional or guaranteeing each ethnic group equal representation – has been subject to party struggles. Especially for the Bosnian Croats, the political control of the town of Mostar is of foremost importance, as it is the centre of their

political power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ceding the mayor office to the Bosniaks would therefore be politically too costly (Crisis Group 2009).

The structure of the electoral districts and malapportionment limits each group's representation to a minority of seats in the assembly (Crisis Group 2009: 10) – and, hence, the town appears perfectly in line with the selection of cases with no clear ethnic majority. The mayor of Mostar is elected indirectly by the local assembly. Originally, she needed to be elected by an absolute majority of votes in the assembly, but since 2010, the rules are read differently, allowing the election of a mayor by a plurality of votes.

Both among ethnic Croats and among ethnic Bosniaks, the nationalist parties dominate. Therefore, the null hypothesis would be the election of a nationalist of either side, but as both sides are exactly equally strong, it is not clear on which side the lot is knocked down.

After the local elections of 2004, the nationalist parties of the Croats (HDZ) and the Bosniaks (SDA) resolved this tricky situation through an alliance at the state-level, which also included the formation of a multi-ethnic coalition in Mostar, and therefore, SDA helped to elect the HDZ candidate to the local mayor office. In turn, HDZ committed itself to elect the SDA candidate in 2008 (Crisis Group 2009: 3).

The political composition of the local assembly changed substantially after the 2008 elections, when ethnic moderates gaining massively in votes and seats, winning 20% of the votes.¹⁶ This, still, leaves the nationalists in the position to elect the new major. The two parties involved in the 2004 agreement, SDA and HDZ, hold the absolute majority 19 out of 35 seats. HDZ's promises, however, never materialised. Instead, the parliament was unable to elect a common mayor, and in 17 rounds of voting, no candidate received the absolute majority of the votes. Only after the High Representative for Bosnia altered the rules of the game, and abandoned the majority requirement, HDZ candidate Ljubo Bešlić was elected on 18 December 2010, in the 3rd round of voting, winning the votes of the 17 Croat members of the assembly, out of 35 votes. The International Crisis Group (2009: 7-8) argues that HDZ did not stick to the 2004 agreement, as it had lost other offices, so that it became more important to keep the Mostar mayor office.

Mostar is arguably one of the most interesting cases of this study: it is the perfect case of an evenly split town, as there is (at least in the assembly) no majority for one group. There are three different cases which we can observe within this town:

- 2004: elections with a majority requirement, and with a coalition of nationalists;

¹⁶ All parties considered moderates declare as multi-ethnic parties, but they are considered to be dominated either by Bosniaks (SDP, Naša Stranka) or by Croats (Radom za Boljtitak). Results by electoral districts tend to confirm these affiliations, but all three parties also get substantial votes from districts dominated by other ethnic groups.

- 2008: elections with a majority requirement, but with no coalition of nationalists;
- 2010: elections with a plurality requirement, and with no coalition of nationalists.

At the existence of a majority requirement, elections either result in a coalition of nationalists, which elects a nationalist mayor of one of the two groups to office (no centripetal effect). The lack of such a coalition results in a political blockade. According to the centripetal expectation, it might be resolved with a coalition including moderates of both sides, but such a coalition does not materialise. The plurality vote resolved this political blockade in favour of the nationalists.

4.7 Târgu Mureş

Population: Romanian 50.3%, Hungarian 46.7% (census 2000)

	<i>turnout</i>	<i>majority* nationalists</i>	<i>majority* moderates</i>	<i>minority</i>	<i>minority nationalists</i>
Local assembly, 2000 (votes)	58.8%	PUNR: 12.0% PRM: 7.9%	CDR: 9.5% PDSR: 6.7%	UDMR: 50.1%	
Mayor, 2000	58.8%	PRM: 3.4% PUNR: 4.7%	CDR/PNȚCD (Dorin Florea): 33.8% PDSR: 2.5%	UDMR (Imre Fodor): 49.8%	
... 2nd round	63.3%		CDR/PNȚCD: 51.5%	UDMR: 48.5%	
Local assembly, 2004 (votes)		PRM: 11.9% PUNR: 7.5% PNG: 2.3%	PNL: 5.3% PSD: 12.0% PD: 3.4% PUR: 3.1% Non-partisans: 8.9%	UDMR: 41.9%	
Mayor, 2004			Independent (Dorin Florea): 56.5% PNL: 1.1% PD: 0.9%	UDMR (Attila Kelemen): 40.3%	
Local assembly, 2008		PRM: 5.0% PSD: 7.9%	PNL: 5.8% PDL: 32.1% others: 5.0%	UDMR: 41.2%	PCM: 2.9%
Mayor, 2008			PD-L (Dorin Florea): 52.5% PNL (Marius Ionel): 1.5% others: 1.1%	UDMR (Laszlo Borbely): 44.9	

Table 7: Overview over electoral results (local assembly, mayor), Mostar, Târgu Mureş, 2000-8.

The Transylvanian town Târgu Mureş was the centre of ethnic riots between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in 1990, but the situation has calmed down, since. The town is evenly split between the two groups. The 1992 census counted 46.1% ethnic Romanians and 51.3% ethnic Hungarians, and most remaining inhabitants declared as Roma (Árpad, 2008). By 2000, the figures were inverted, and 50.3% ethnic Romanians were a narrow majority.

The ethnic Romanian political landscape is split in many parties, and the nationalist parties (especially, PUNR and PRM) are particularly strong in multi-ethnic environments, and get a similar amount of votes as the more moderate parties and coalitions (CDR/PNL, PDSR/PSD, PD).¹⁷ Given the slight majority of Romanians, according to the null hypothesis, the largest Romanian political party or bloc might win the mandate. Both in 2000 and 2004, the nationalists (PUNR in 2000, PRM in 2004) and the moderates are similarly strong (CDR in 2000, PSD in 2004), and candidates and alliances decide which party is the strongest.

Differently, the Hungarian minority organisation (UDMR) was the only ethnic Hungarian competitor until 2008, and its vote share equalled the share of ethnic Hungarians. The organisation also held the incumbent mayor, Imre Fodor. He is described as a clear ethnically oriented politician with not very good conduct of Romanian, was challenged by a strong Romanian candidate Dorin Florea from the small peasant-Christian Democratic party (PNȚCD), which was part of the Romanian right-wing coalition CDR. Our interlocutors describe Florea at this time being popular with Hungarian voters. His opponent, the Romanian Florea, having served as a medical doctor, was perceived as a moderate, and could speak to both groups. Florea, who was incumbent prefect of the district, was already in conflict with Fodor. He declared that he enters elections only if mayor Fodor runs again in elections, but he would leave the field if another candidate would run. While different sources disagree whether there are differences in the level of radicalism of the candidates, the possible alternative candidate, MP László Borbély, is perceived as more vital, but less experienced at time. Certainly, he is considered to be more capable of appealing to the Romanian electorate¹⁸. Nevertheless, UDMR stucked to the incumbent Fodor. Later, Fodor took up the presidency of the Szekler National Council, which is close to the more radical wing of the Hungarian minority. The question, why Florea received such a large support in the first round of the mayor elections, far beyond the electorate of CDR, should be looked at more carefully, especially with regards to strategic votes from Romanian nationalists.

In the 2000 elections, Fodor gained more than 49% of the votes, being the sole ethnic Hungarian candidate in the first round, but then lost in the second round against Dorin Florea, who gained 51.5% of the votes. We could not ascertain whether Florea's inter-ethnic popularity paid out in cross-ethnic votes, or whether he solely profited from better mobilisation of the Romanian voters. Similarly, we are not aware of any evidence for a

¹⁷ See also Datculescu (1999), Lazăr (1999).

¹⁸ “eventuală candidatură a domnului Borbély László le-ar fi avut față de domnul Fodor: prestanță, tinerețe (chiar dacă în spirit o are și domnul Fodor, s-a văzut că vitalitatea, prospețimea a contat foarte mult), ușurința (și disponibilitatea!) de a comunica cu alegătorii români și, nu în ultimul rînd, faptul că e tîrgumureșean getbegeto-dac, ca să zic așa, după vorbă și comportament...” (Cosmeanu, 2000).

campaign aiming at cross-ethnic votes. If cross-ethnic voting was involved, it might have been rather discretely, without explicit campaigns for cross-ethnic votes, or declared inter-ethnic coalitions.

In later elections, 2004 and 2008, Dorin Florea could increase his lead over the Hungarian candidate. The conduct of the mayor office might have increased his popularity. Neither any other relevant Romanian candidates contested the office, nor was there was no strong Hungarian candidate to defeat him.

Given that the Romanians became the slightly larger ethnic group by 2000, the move of the mandate from the Hungarians (in the 1990s) to the Romanians (in 2000) is little surprising. It is the result of mobilisation in each ethnic group, and possibly of inter-ethnic voting. The result, however, is in line with the null hypothesis. The victory of a Romanian moderate, however, is not that clear, given that the Romanian party landscape is very fractionalised. It appears, however, that in the crucial 2000 elections, the Hungarian candidate mobilised wide parts of the Hungarian electorate. With the information available from experts and the aggregated electoral data, we cannot establish whether the election of the moderate Romanian candidate might also rely on a handful of pivotal votes obtained from Hungarian voters, or is solely based on good mobilisation of the Romanian electorate. At least, a minor centripetal effect, strong enough to win the elections, can not be excluded.

5 Comparative discussion of the results

The analysed local elections give a mixed picture about the centripetalist effect working in evenly split municipalities.

We have gathered information on position of their parties to other parties of the same ethnic group, and where possible, about the political position of the candidates themselves on nationalism-related issues. In some of the investigated municipalities, Prijepolje (in 2004), Čoka (in 2004, 2008), Târgu Mureş (2000, 2004, 2008), and Bujanovac (2002, 2006, 2008), candidates belonging to a rather moderate political party win the mayor elections. Elsewhere, Mostar (2004, 2010), Struga (2005, 2009), Kičevo (2005, 2009), Prijepolje (2008), candidates of the relatively rather nationalist options win, and once in Mostar (2008), the election ends in a political blockade.

We further distinguish those cases where the election of a moderate was the outcome by default, expected by our null hypothesis. In Bujanovac (2002, 2006, 2008), the election of a moderate candidate does not result from the centripetal effect of majoritarian institutions, but is due to the fact that his party, PDD, is the largest party among the ethnic Albanians, and

they are the larger group in the municipality. 2008, the PDD candidate was elected as the mayor of a solely Albanian coalition and in earlier elections, there is no evidence for inter-ethnic voting.

There are, however, three municipalities and six elections, where the centripetal effect and inter-ethnic voting might have played a role for the election of the local mayor. In a further case, a strategy in line with the centripetal theory failed, allegedly due to electoral fraud.

- In Prijepolje, in 2004, two Bosniak candidate ran against each other in the second round of the mayor election. In this situation, the Serbian parties informally supported the more moderate of both candidates, and were followed by a large part of the Serbian voters. This enabled the moderate victory.
- In Čoka, the Serbian candidate of the multi-ethnic Democratic Party, DS, ran against the candidate of the a larger ethnic Hungarian party in the second round of the mayor elections. The DS candidate won a landslide victory, because his candidacy for a multi-ethnic party allowed him to appeal to both groups. He received most Serbian votes (from moderate and nationalist Serbian voters), along with some votes from the Hungarians. However, if he would have lost only a few votes less in the first round, he would have dropped out the elections, and a Serbian nationalist would have entered the second round, and the result might have been a different one. In 2008, the re-election was clearer, as the DS became the largest party in the meanwhile, and as mayor elections were moved to the local assembly, and there, a majority coalition needs to be formed, which can hardly avoid the DS.
- In Târgu Mureș, a Romanian moderate was elected 2000, in a narrow race, against the Hungarian incumbent, in the second round of elections. The null hypothesis is not easily measurable, and it might be that the victory of a moderate might be the result of a centripetal effect and even of a handful of inter-ethnic votes (but we can not ascertain their occurring or their number). While elections were fought along ethnic lines, in the evenly split towns, even a very small number of inter-ethnic votes, or differences in voter mobilisation, are pivotal for the outcome of the elections.
- In Struga, in 2009, everything looked like the perfectly orchestrated attempt to elect a moderate candidate, who is acceptable to both ethnic groups, to office. However, elections were allegedly rigged, and an Albanian nationalist was re-elected.

We have expected that the centripetal effect relies on four assumptions. We further discuss whether these assumptions are met.

1. Are there alliances of the nationalists?

Coalitions of nationalists have been identified in three elections in two municipalities, and possibly in further cases: in Kičevo (in 2005, 2009), in Mostar (in 2004), and possibly also Struga (in 2005). In Prijepolje there were non-successful contacts in 2009 to establish such a coalition. In four cases, the coalitions of nationalists were mirroring governing alliances in the central government (Kičevo, Struga), or in the sub-state government (Mostar), and the local coalitions were probably created due to the governmental cooperation at higher levels.¹⁹

Inter-ethnic voting, along an alliance of nationalists, clearly occurred in the 2009 mayor elections in Kičevo. The candidate of the previously Macedonian nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party profited from the support of the nationalist Albanians, DUI. The Albanian nationalists were not present with an own candidate, allegedly in order to support its coalition partner VMRO-DPMNE. Even if only a small part of the DUI voters voted for VMRO-DPMNE, this was enough to elect their candidate to the mayor office in the first round.

In Mostar, in 2004, Croats and Bosniak nationalists, which are the main parties in the assembly, agreed to elect a Croat nationalist as mayor. Four years later, when the Croats should return the favour to the Bosniaks, the alliance broke apart.

We further were told about contacts between the nationalists of both sides after the local elections of 2008 in Prijepolje, but the parties involved (on the Serbian side, only the Serbian Radical Party took part) were not sufficiently strong to form a majority coalition that would enable the election through the local assembly. In other cases, we are not aware of coalitions of nationalists. This explains why the election of a moderate candidate was possible.

A different obstacle against the election of a moderate is, however, the intensity of the ethnic conflict, and three assumptions which build on it.

... *2. Moderate voters prefer moderates of the other group over nationalists of the other group.*

This assumption is the key of the centripetal hypothesis. It would explain inter-ethnic voting. However, evidence for inter-ethnic voting is rare. The only clear case is Čoka, where the most moderate Hungarian voters vote for candidate of a large multi-ethnic party, who is an ethnic Serb, even if he runs against an ethnic Hungarian.

¹⁹ We found the strongest evidence for a local coalition that has been negotiated exclusively in the capital, however, in the municipality of Prijepolje: There, a Bosniak moderates ceded the mayor office to a Serbian nationalist.

In other municipalities, there is only very limited evidence that such an effect plays. The attempts in Struga to elect a mayor from the Torbeši minority, partly shows a similar pattern. There, a moderate candidate who did not belong to either of the large groups, with a transient identity, could gather moderate votes from both large groups. However, while the support from ethnic Macedonians for the Torbeši candidate was strong, moderate Albanians predominately voted for their own nationalist candidate in the second round, and only isolated votes were cast for the Torbeši candidate. In Târgu Mureş, there was possibly a small percentage of the moderate Hungarian voters to vote for a moderate Romanian, but their own candidate remained in the competition, what would explain the small enthusiasm to cast a cross-ethnic vote. Finally, the case of Prijepolje is not comparable. There, a part of the Serbian voters voted for the moderate Bosniak candidate, when no Serbian candidate remained in second round.

... 3. The nationalists of either group have an absolute majority of votes.

The assumption that none of the nationalists has an absolute majority is almost automatically fulfilled in evenly split towns. By definition, none of the ethnic groups has a clear majority, and as we further separate the groups into nationalists and moderates, the moderates of the (slightly) larger ethnic group would need to be almost non-existent, so that the nationalists might have an absolute majority of votes in town. It is worth to note that we have classified the relative position of parties and candidates, compared to other parties and (potential) candidates of the same group. Therefore, our operationalisation is usually not able to identify nationalist majorities, even if (according to absolute measures, which unfortunately do not yet exist), it should turn out that all parties of one ethnic group are nationalists. One might think of the case of Bujanovac, for instance, where all Albanian parties have similar programs, but certainly differ in their style and behaviour.

... 4. is there a strong moderate or even multi-ethnic party?

In ethnically deeply divided contexts, this condition is often not fulfilled. However, there are a few cases with strong moderate parties, and there, they win the mayor office, with one exception. In Prijepolje, the strongest party, SDP, is a moderate Bosniak party, and it won the mayor office in 2004, but not in 2008 (indirect election). In Čoka, the multi-ethnic DS became the strongest party by 2008, while in 2004 (local assembly elections results), it was the third-largest party. In Bujanovac, the most moderate Albanian party, PDD, is the strongest party.

In all other elections, the condition is not fulfilled. In both ethnic groups, nationalists are stronger than the moderates, and therefore it is no surprise if the mayors are nationalists. In Kičevo and in Mostar, there are no strong moderates, so that in none of the investigated elections, a moderate made it to the second round of the mayor elections. Voters (Mostar: the assembly) had the choice between two nationalists, or elected a nationalist even in the first round of the elections (as in Kičevo in 2009).

Similarly, in 2009 in Struga and in 2004 in Čoka, there were no strong moderates. In Târgu Mureș, moderate and nationalist Romanians are approximately equally strong. In all three municipalities, however, moderate or multi-ethnic mayor candidates received much more votes than their political parties in the 1st round of the elections. This allowed them to enter in the 2nd round of elections, and in Čoka and Târgu Mureș to win the mayor office.

In Struga, this might have been the result of a strategic move by the ethnic Macedonian parties: they hoped that, in a centripetal matter, this might allow the candidate to win the second round. It should be ascertained whether the cases of Târgu Mureș and Čoka rely on the personal popularity of the candidates, or whether similar strategic considerations motivated ethnic Romanians in Târgu Mureș and ethnic Serbs in Čoka to concentrate their votes on the moderate candidates. Possibly, nationalist parties were thinking in line with the centripetal hypothesis, and wanted to elect a mayor of their own group at all price. If only a moderate candidate might gain more inter-ethnic votes and be elected as mayor, then strategic nationalists might vote for the moderate in the first round. If this is the case, then a centripetal effect might occur even if assumption four is not fulfilled.

6 Conclusion

The story reads like a masterpiece, found in a textbook on voting strategies. Struga is a town in Macedonia, where the population is evenly split between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, who just ended a violent conflict, a few years ago. The incumbent mayor Ramis Merko, an Albanian nationalist hardliner, is all but the ideal officeholder to ease co-existence of the conflicting groups in Struga, and he keeps provoking the Macedonians with sensitive issues, such as building a controversial monument in a symbolic place. However, the Macedonians realise that given the structure of the electorate, and given that Albanian voters might difficultly be convinced of voting for an ethnic Macedonian, none of their candidates could ever win a majority of the votes, and become mayor.

In this situation, they play the card of the Torbeši, a small ethnic group with a transient identity – sharing the language with Macedonians, and sharing the religion with Albanians, and both consider them as their ethnic kin, which makes the Torbeši acceptable as political

partner and representative to both of them. In the first round of the mayor elections, the main ethnic Macedonian parties, which otherwise would not lose any opportunity to defend every piece of Macedonia also politically, either refrain from presenting their own candidate (Social Democrats), or present an apparently weak candidate (the more nationalist Macedonian VMRO-DMPNE), and, as our analysis shows, Macedonian voters vote in sufficiently large numbers for a Torbeši candidate, in order to make him enter the second round of the elections, against the incumbent Albanian nationalist. In the second round, he gets much more united support from ethnic Macedonians, and, jointly with the Torbeši votes and a few moderate Albanians, who are disappointed by the incumbent, and to whom a Torbeši candidate is acceptable, this coalition of voters should have a majority of the votes. This would be an exiting end to the story, where the majoritarian vote, due to its centripetal properties, joint with strategic candidate withdrawal by the Macedonians, and joint with the idea to use fluent and transient ethnic identities for political bridge-building, helps to elect a candidate who can unite opposed ethnic groups in a deeply divided municipality. However, the story ends differently; the incumbent mayor apparently intimidates parts of the voters, rigs the second round of the elections, and is re-elected narrowly.

Apart from Struga, we have analysed six other evenly split towns in South-East Europe (Bosnia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia), for centripetal effects in mayor elections by majority vote, in the period 2000-2010. We found only little evidence for such effects, and limited to cases where the conflict is not too strong. In Târgu Mureş, it might be that a handful of ethnic Hungarian voters voted for a moderate Romanian candidate in the second round of the mayor elections of 2000, but possibly, he was just elected because he was better in mobilising the Romanian voters. In Čoka, a strong multi-ethnic party (DS) regularly manages to win votes from both ethnic groups, Hungarians and Serbs. With votes from both groups, once it enters the second round of the elections, it wins either against ethnic Serbian or ethnic Hungarian parties, as its candidate can always count on the votes of the DS voters plus the votes of the other ethnic group. In Prijepolje, cross-ethnic voting played a major role in 2004: two Bosniak candidates made it to the second round of the mayor elections. There, the ethnic Serbs helped to elect the moderate.

More frequent, however, are contrary examples. Often, in such situations, the nationalists of all colours realise that inter-ethnic voting favours the minorities, and as a reaction, they form a coalition of nationalists. They are lethal for the effect of conciliation, which centripetal theory expects for majoritarian elections in ethnically split polities. The centripetal idea relies on the property of majoritarian voting systems, that a politician, in order to be elected, needs a

majority of votes. In ethnically split places – especially in evenly split ones – this creates the need to appeal to both ethnic groups. As candidates with moderate positions are more likely to gain inter-ethnic votes than radicals, majoritarian institutions should favour moderate candidates.

Apart from the mentioned examples, the analysis in this paper shows a rather pessimistic picture for the centripetal idea. Either, nationalists of all colours form alliances, and hinder the elections of a moderate candidate (as happened in Kičevo, 2005 and 2009, or in Mostar in 2004). Or, if the ethnic conflict is too strong, and inter-ethnic violence is too recent, then inter-ethnic voting is unrealistic. Then, voting and political coalitions go strictly along ethnic lines, and inter-ethnic coalitions are only formed if they put not in question the political control exerted by the larger ethnic group (e.g. Bujanovac).

Earlier research on elections in ethnically mixed places has shown that in divided societies, ethnic heterogeneity contributes to radicalisation. Therefore, in mixed-ethnic environments, the nationalists of the majority group quickly become dominant. Every kind of majoritarian institution would hence allow the ethnic majority to elect their own radical. Evenly split towns, which are investigated in this paper, might be an exception to this rule: if two ethnic groups are almost equally strong, the centripetal effect should be strong enough to allow a moderate candidate to be elected. To win a majority of votes, almost every candidate needs some support across ethnic lines, and a moderate is more likely to obtain such.

Empirical results are mixed. If a moderate wins the mayor elections, this is mostly due to strong moderate parties, and non-radicalised preferences, and not a product of the centripetal effect. If however, – as typical in divided societies – ethnic preferences are radicalised, the centripetal effect fails. This is certainly no good news for the prospects of electoral engineering the victory of moderates in ethnically divided societies. At least this study might contribute a new question mark regarding the centripetal effect of the majoritarian vote.

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Appendix: Aggregated data analysis for mayor elections in Kičevo and in Struga, 2009

Seemingly unrelated regression analysis for electoral wards, units weighted by their size (number of valid votes).

Results for Kičevo

There is only a minor instance of cross-ethnic voting in the first round of the mayor elections. Voters who voted for the main Albanian parties in the local assembly elections which did not present an own candidate (DUI), seem to have voted only in small numbers for the ethnic Macedonian candidate. It appears that only some 25% of the DUI voters might have voted for the candidate of their national ally, VMRO, and the support for the Albanian candidate by ND might have been equal or higher. Most of all, turnout in Albanian parts of the town was substantially lower for the mayor elections than in the Macedonian wards, which suggests that many DUI voters – despite the VMRO-DUI alliance – preferred not to vote for any of the mayor candidates.

<i>Dependent var.</i>	VMRO-DPMNE		SDSM		LDP		ND		Turnout	
	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	Coef.	S.e.
Non-partisan1	0.231	-0.200	0.113	-0.541	-0.111	-0.111	0.113	-0.541	0.312	0.162
Non-partisan3	0.249	-0.229	0.121	0.420	0.067	0.067	0.121	0.420	-0.183	0.175
PCERM (Roma)	0.109	-0.050	0.053	0.066	-0.043	-0.043	0.053	0.066	-0.079	0.076
SDSM	0.189	1.033	0.092	-0.153	0.145	0.145	0.092	-0.153	-0.328	0.133
DUI	0.095	-0.198	0.046	-0.278	-0.049	-0.049	0.046	-0.278	0.045	0.067
VMRO-DPMNE	0.133	-0.149	0.064	-0.429	-0.016	-0.016	0.064	-0.429	-0.328	0.093
LDP	0.289	0.089	0.140	0.190	-0.032	-0.032	0.140	0.190	-0.282	0.203
ND	0.536	-0.206	0.261	-0.187	0.027	0.027	0.261	-0.187	1.189	0.376
turnout	0.134	-0.203	0.065	0.013	0.989	0.989	0.065	0.013	0.044	0.094
constant	0.093	0.270	0.045	0.317	-0.001	-0.001	0.045	0.317	0.223	0.065
N		35		35	35	35		35	35	
R ²		0.926		0.752	0.995	0.995		0.752	0.935	
χ ²		435.4		105.8	7332.7	7332.7		105.8	500.6	

Table A1: Seemingly unrelated regression, local assembly elections and mayor elections 2009, Kičevo.

Notes: The explanatory variables are the vote shares of parties (or turnout) in the local assembly elections (by PR), by electoral ward. Dependent variables are the vote shares of candidates (or turnout) in the first round of the mayor elections.

For a meaningful interpretation of the results, the constant and turnout (mean: 56.1%) need to be taken into account. Not all small parties/candidates included.

Results for Struga

There is strong evidence for cross-ethnic voting in the first round of the mayor elections. The vote shares of SDSM correlate with the success of the Torbeši candidate (running for the PEI party). Based on the aggregated results, a very substantial part (about 60%) of the SDSM voters in the local assembly elections might have voted for the PEI candidate, and further some 15-20% of the VMRO-DPMNE electorate (despite VMRO running with an own candidate). However, the PEI candidate seems not to have received any votes from supporters of the ethnic Albanian parties (DUI, DPA, ND).

<i>Dependent var.</i>	DPA		PEI		DUI		VMRO-DPMNE		ND		Turnout	
	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.
turnout	-0.137	0.074	-0.036	0.060	0.174	0.073	0.098	0.042	-0.098	0.035	0.968	0.013
ND	-0.053	0.139	-0.261	0.114	-0.197	0.139	-0.143	0.080	0.654	0.067	0.022	0.024
SDSM	-0.466	0.150	0.226	0.122	-0.056	0.149	0.262	0.086	0.035	0.072	0.046	0.026
DUI	-0.290	0.126	-0.379	0.103	0.798	0.126	-0.137	0.073	0.007	0.061	0.044	0.022
DPA	0.568	0.135	-0.413	0.110	-0.164	0.134	-0.111	0.078	0.121	0.065	0.014	0.023
VMRO-DPMNE	-0.267	0.136	-0.288	0.111	-0.254	0.135	0.741	0.078	0.067	0.065	0.043	0.023
PEI	-0.398	0.122	0.635	0.100	-0.084	0.121	-0.141	0.070	-0.011	0.059	0.032	0.021
constant	0.415	0.119	0.407	0.098	0.095	0.119	0.077	0.069	0.005	0.057	-0.005	0.020
N	75		75		75		75		75		75	
R ²	0.902		0.967		0.953		0.989		0.823		0.993	
χ ²	689.3		2196.6		1529.4		6995.1		348.6		11010.0	

Table A2: Seemingly unrelated regression, local assembly elections and first round of mayor elections 2009, Struga.

Notes: The explanatory variables are the vote shares of parties (or turnout) in the local assembly elections (by PR), by electoral ward. Dependent variables are the vote shares of candidates (or turnout) in the first round of the mayor elections.

For a meaningful interpretation of the results, the constant and turnout (mean: 53.4%) need to be taken into account. Not all small parties/candidates included.

In the second round, the PEI candidate seems to have won votes both in Macedonian-dominated and in Albanian-dominated electoral wards. In predominately Macedonian wards, compared to the results of the local assembly elections, we estimate that almost all SDSM voters and most VMRO-DPMNE voters (85%) might have cast their vote for the Torbeši candidate of PEI, but there is also a non-significant drop in turnout in these wards. Further, a smaller number of voters of ethnic Albanian parties might have voted for the Torbeši candidate in the second round; - this amounts to approximately 20% of the votes of the moderate Albanian parties DPA and ND.

Dependent var.	PEI		Turnout	
	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.
turnout	0.190	0.082	0.754	0.053
ND	-0.394	0.141	-0.132	0.092
SDSM	0.412	0.149	-0.021	0.098
DUI	-0.737	0.126	0.043	0.083
DPA	-0.439	0.136	-0.142	0.089
VMRO-DPMNE	0.207	0.135	-0.086	0.089
PEI	0.471	0.122	-0.091	0.080
constant	0.542	0.121	0.215	0.079
N	74		74	
R ²	0.983		0.840	
χ ²	4146.4		388.8	

Table A3: Seemingly unrelated regression, local assembly elections and second round of mayor elections 2009, Struga.

Notes: The explanatory variables are the vote shares of parties (or turnout) in the local assembly elections (by PR), by electoral ward. Dependent variables are the vote shares of candidates (or turnout) in the second round of the mayor elections.

For a meaningful interpretation of the results, the constant and turnout (mean: 53.4%) need to be taken into account; turnout in the 2nd round was 56.2%. Not all small parties/candidates included.

The comparison with the results of the first round of the mayor elections is very much in line with the comparison with the local assembly elections. Some 85% of the voters of the VMRO-DPMNE candidate and some 20% of the DPA candidate might have shifted to the PEI candidate in the second round. In DUI strongholds, the PEI candidate did not make any additional votes. Also, there is a non-significant increase in turnout in the DUI-dominated wards in the second round.

Dependent var.	PEI		Turnout	
	Coef.	S.e.	Coef.	S.e.
turnout	0.217	0.084	0.769	0.056
DPA	0.198	0.155	0.036	0.104
PEI	1.115	0.128	0.017	0.086
DUI	-0.062	0.124	0.088	0.084
VMRO-DPMNE	0.867	0.117	0.040	0.079
constant	-0.117	0.129	0.102	0.087
N	74		74	
R ²	0.983		0.834	
χ ²	4222.5		371.9	

Table A4: Seemingly unrelated regression, first and second round of mayor elections 2009, Struga.

Notes: The explanatory variables are the vote shares of parties (or turnout) in the first round of the mayor elections by electoral ward. Dependent variables are the vote shares of candidates (or turnout) in the second round of the mayor elections.

For a meaningful interpretation of the results, the constant and turnout (mean: 53.4%) need to be taken into account; turnout in the 2nd round was 56.2%. Not all small parties/candidates included.